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CRIMINAL LAW-Incompetency Of Retained Counsel
Cannot Afford A Basis For Reversal Of A Judgment Rendered In A Criminal Trial.
On May 23, 1967, Joseph R. Hurst, driving with a friend, was
stopped on Cottage Grove Avenue in Chicago, Illinois, for speeding by
Officers Ervin and Stallworth of the Chicago Police Department. The
officers asked Hurst for his driver's license and he stated he had none
on his person. While Officer Ervin was in the squad car making a
radio report, two shots were fired, fatally wounding Stallworth. Hearing the shots, Officer Ervin looked up as a third shot was fired by
Hurst through the squad car windshield, wounding Ervin in the face.
Hurst then fled from the scene and was subsequently apprehended.
Defendant Hurst was brought to trial in the Circuit Court of Cook
County on charges of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery
and resisting arrest. He pleaded not guilty and waived his right to a
jury trial. At the conclusion of the bench trial he was found guilty and
sentenced to death by electrocution. Hurst's motion for a new trial
was denied. A direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was perfected, urging various constitutional and procedural errors. The defendant first contended that he had acted in self defense, using only
such force as was reasonably necessary to prevent his own death. Alternatively, he argued that he was so provoked by the deceased officer
that he reasonably believed he was acting in self-defense, and consequently, his conviction should have been reduced to one for voluntary
manslaughter. Additional reversible errors were alleged to have been
committed at the defendant's hearing on aggravation and mitigation
which denied him due process of law.
The defendant also contended that he was denied his right to a trial
by a fair jury insured by the seventh and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution. Specifically, he argued that when he
purportedly waived this right, he was faced with a choice between a
bench trial or a trial before a jury in which all jurors who were opposed
to the death penalty would have been excluded in violation of the seventh amendment.'
1. Additional allegations of errors on appeal were that the death sentence was
demanded by the prosecutor because Hurst had not pleaded guilty, that the rehabilitation question was limited to defendant's mental capacity, that the trial judge failed to
give reasons for his decision and finally that the electric chair constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.
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Finally, Hurst claimed that because his attorney was incompetent
he was denied due process and equal protection of the law. In support
of this contention, the defendant asserted that his retained counsel was
completely unprepared to present his defense because he had not familiarized himself with the case. Additionally, his counsel had failed
to call a material witness, failed to raise the issue of voluntary manslaughter, failed to effectively cross-examine the witnesses and attempted
to use defendant's case as a vehicle to foster his theories of psychic
science and spiritualism.
In affirming the conviction 2 the court, after disposing of Hurst's other
objections, considered the issue of incompetency of counsel and held:
Since the defendant was represented by counsel of his own choosing, counsel's alleged failure to exercise care and skill in the trial of
his case cannot afford a basis for reversing the judgment entered.a
The future significance of Hurst will undoubtedly lie in its treatment
of the issue of adequacy of representation by a retained attorney. This
view is born out by the strong dissent of Mr. Justice Schaefer in which
he criticized the majority for failing to adhere to the rule previously
applied in cases where the issue has been raised. Whereas the majority
automatically dismissed the assertion of incompetency without first reviewing the record, the dissent points out that the Illinois Supreme
Court prior to Hurst had always reviewed the record before determining
a claim of incompetency of retained counsel. In People v. Pride,4 the
court stated that:
[W]here a defendant in a criminal case employs counsel of his own
choice, his judgment of conviction will not be reversed merely because his counsel failed to exercise the greatest skill ....
However,
[W]hen the representation of the defendant ....
is of such low
caliber as to amount to no representation and reduces the trial to
a farce, this Court will reverse a conviction because the defendant,
under these circumstances, has been deprived of his constitutional
right to a fair trial. 5
Justice Schaefer further indicated that even in People v. Underhill,'
relied upon by the majority, the court did not automatically dismiss the
assertion of incompetency, but first examined the record of the trial
court. In his view, precluding all inquiry into the competency of
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

People v. Hurst, 42 Ill. 2d 217, 247 N.E.2d 614 (1969).
Id. at 617.
16 Il1. 2d 82, 156 N.E.2d 551 (1959).
16 I11.2d at 94.
38 111. 2d 245, 230 N.E.2d 837 (1967).
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counsel merely because he was employed by the appellant is unwise and
raises serious constitutional questions.
There have been many Illinois cases in which the issue of the incompetency of counsel has been raised. Where the defendant selected his
own attorney the court has held, almost without exception, 7 that the
failure of such counsel to exercise care and skill in the trial of the case
does not afford a sufficient basis for reversing a judgment of conviction." In People v. Pride,9 where the defendant alleged a denial of a
fair and impartial trial because of the incompetency of his retained
counsel, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that tactical or judgmental
errors will not afford a reversal.
It should be remembered, however, that we, along with defendant's
present counsel have the benefit of hind sight in evaluating the
tactics defendant's first counsel used. The situation is like the Monday morning quarterback who says that the team should have run
rather than passed after he knows the pass did not work. 10
While the principle established in Pride is clearly applicable to
Hurst, the cases are distinguishable because the defendant in Hurst
was alleging more than mere tactical or judgmental errors. The attorney's alleged complete unpreparedness to present his defense and advancement of theories of psychic science and spiritualism were claimed
to have substantially infringed upon the integrity of the trial procedures.
Prior to the instant case, the rule generally applied in the Illinois
courts was that a conviction should be reversed whenever the representation of a defendant by a retained counsel was so ineffective as to
amount to no representation at all, reducing the trial to a farce." Thus,
in People v. De Simone,'" where the defendant's retained counsel presented a wholly unorthodox insanity defense, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the representation was so ineffective as to amount to no representation at all. The court explained that this unorthodox method of
defense exposed defense counsel's apparent lack of knowledge of basic
criminal procedure and rules of evidence. When coupled with his
7. People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
8. People v. Bock, 95 Ill. App. 2d 486, 238 N.E.2d 136 (1968); People v.
Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 6, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968); People v. Mitchell, 73 Ill. App.
2d 35, 220 N.E.2d 19 (1966); People v. Pierce, 387 Ill. 608, 57 N.E.2d 345 (1944);
People v. McDonald, 35 Ill. 233, 6 N.E.2d 182 (1936); People v. Hicks, 362 Ill.
238, 199 N.E. 368 (1935).
9. See note 4, supra.
10. 16 111. 2d at 96.
11. See note 6, supra. See also People v. Clark, 9 Ill. 2d 46, 137 N.E.2d 54
(1956); People v. Stephen, 6 Ill. 2d 257, 128 N.E.2d 731 (1955); People v. Morris,
3 Ill. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
12. See note 7, supra.
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other tactical and judgmental errors, the court concluded that there
was an abridgement of the defendant's fourteenth amendment right of
due process of law.
People v. Hurst is, on its facts, analogous to People v. De Simone.
Defendant Hurst claimed that his rights had been violated by counsel's
attempt to use his case as a vehicle to foster his theories of psychic science and spiritualism. In addition to this wholly unorthodox defense,
the other alleged indications of incompetency of counsel included lack
of investigation of the facts, and the failure to effectively cross-examine
witnesses.
Presumably, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to even consider the
merits of the inadequacy of counsel contention because it did not review
the record of the circuit court with this purpose in mind. Instead, the
court automatically dismissed the claim by stating that when a defendant chooses his own counsel he cannot later be heard to complain about
lack of his attorney's care and skill in handling the case.
The allegation of incompetency of retained counsel had in some cases
been treated rather summarily because there was nothing in the record
to show the alleged incompetency or any prejudice resulting therefrom. 3 On the other hand, in Hurst the nature of the alleged incompetency was such that the facts which would either establish or disprove
it were determinable from the face of the record.
In support of Justice Schaefer's dissent the Illinois courts have, in
the past, reviewed the record to determine whether the representation
by retained counsel was so inadequate as to cause prejudicial error.' 4
In People v. Stephens,'5 the court first repeated the general rule, then
explained that any other rule would put a premium upon pretended incompetence of counsel.' 6 Nevertheless, the court did review the entire
record before arriving at its decision finding that the representation of
defendant was not of such a low caliber as to require a reversal.
In People v. Underhill,17 relied upon by the majority in Hurst, the
13. 3 Ill. 2d at 445, 446.
14. People v. Duncan, 32 Ill. 2d 322, 205 N.E.2d 443 (1965); People v. Palmer,
27 Ill. 2d 311, 189 N.E.2d 265 (1963); People v. Strader, 23 I11. 2d 13, 177 N.E.2d
126 (1961); People v. Clark, 16 Ill. 2d 82, 137 N.E.2d 54 (1959); People v. Clark,
7 Ill. 2d 163, 130 N.E.2d 195 (1955). It also might be worthy to note that the brief
submitted by the State reflected the thought that the Supreme Court would review the
record: "The record demonstrates that trial counsel was not only within the competence standards for retained counsel, but was also well within the competence standards
for appointed counsel." at 34.
15. See note 11, supra.
16. See Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968) as to how the
federal court handled this problem.

17.

See note 6, supra.
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court stated:
From an examination of the record we cannot say defendant's representation was so inadequate as to violate the standards laid down
for private counsel.

Therefore, defendant must

. . .

bear the con-

sequences of his chosen attorney's representation.' 8 [emphasis
added]
Obviously, it was not until the record was examined that the court
decided that the defendant should "bear the consequences." In People
v. Pride, the court again stated that from an examination of the entire record the defendant's counsel did not do a wholly inadequate
job. "Since the record is free from substantial prejudicial error and
the defendant's guilt has been clearly established

.

,19

the Illinois

Supreme Court affirmed.
The Hurst court did review the record on the basis of the other contentions. However, if incompetency of counsel had been the sole basis
for appeal, the opinion indicates the court would have summarily dismissed the case without reviewing the record.2 0
The position of the federal courts regarding the incompetency of
retained counsel issue is similar to the position taken by the Illinois
courts before Hurst.
In Cross v. United States, 21 the defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess and pass counterfeit federal reserve notes with intent to
defraud and of passing and uttering the notes. The defendant appealed on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
as contemplated by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court stated:
The rule applicable is that a charge of inadequate representation can
prevail only if it can be said that what was or was not done by the
defendant's attorney for his client made the proceedings a farce
22
and a mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience of the court.
On this basis the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reviewed the record and found that the trial technique of defendant's
retained counsel was adequate. However, in view of defense counsel's
statement that his willful neglect of duty resulted in defendant's case
not being investigated or developed, the court remanded the case with
18.
19.

38 Ill.
2d at 254, 255.
16 Ill.
2d at 98.

20. The Supreme Court indicated in the record that the allegation could not
afford a basis for reversing the judgment, so it must be inferred they would never
reverse.
21. See note 16, supra.
22. 392 F.2d at 366.
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instruction for an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had, in fact, been
abridged.
In Lunce v. Overlade,2" the defendants appealed the denial of their
request for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that they were not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The court stated:
[A]s a rule, an accused cannot proceed to trial with counsel of his
own choice and then later claim a denial of due process chargeable
to the state because of errors committed by such counsel. .. However, where the representation of an accused by his counsel is so
lacking in diligence and competence that the accused is without
representation and the trial is reduced to a sham, it is the duty of
the state to see that the essential24rights of the accused are preserved by appropriate intervention.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
the dismissal of the petition and remanded the cases to the district court,
stating that if the petitioners could establish by adequate and competent
proof the pertinent allegations contained in their petition, then the convictions would be so lacking in fundamental fairness that they could
not be sustained.
The Cross and Lunce cases indicate that to determine whether the
trial was a sham, farce, or mockery of justice denying the accused due
process of law or invading his right to effective assistance of counsel,
the practice of the federal courts is to review the record of the lower
court decision.
However, it should be noted that a conviction will be reversed only
upon a showing of an extraordinary set of facts and circumstances.
The federal courts generally will not afford relief for claimed inex25
perience, lack of preparation, unskillfulness, or mistakes of judgment.
This reluctance to invalidate judgments because of ineffective representation is based, at least in part, on the fear that unscrupulous counsel
can easily upset a valid conviction by deliberately failing to perform an
essential function during the course of the trial.2"
The decision in Hurst appears to alter the longstanding procedure
of both the Illinois and the federal courts. Prior to Hurst, the Illinois
courts of review would, upon the showing of an extraordinary set of
23. 244 F.3d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
24. 244 F.2d at 110.
25. Huspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941); Tompsetl v. Ohio, 146
F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1943); Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ind. 1955).
26. See note 16, supra.
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circumstances, review the trial court record on the issue of the adequacy of representation by privately retained counsel. 7
Because the United States Supreme Court has, in a steady progression
of criminal cases involving right to counsel,28 indicated that this right
involves a right to representation which is in some degree "effective"
or "adequate," the failure of the Illinois Supreme Court in Hurst to
review the record may have violated the defendant's rights under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. The case most
often cited as establishing a substantive right to representation which
is adequate or effective is Powell v. Alabama.29 In Powell, the United
States Supreme Court plainly stated that the concept of due process of
law contained in the fourteenth amendment condemns any "denial of
effective and substantial aid." Although the case dealt with a failure
to make an effective appointment of counsel, the denial referred to can
just as easily be present where the attorney is privately retained.
Nevertheless, many courts have, in their attempts to delimit claims
of incompetency of counsel, distinguished between privately retained
counsel and court-appointed counsel and made review more readily
available in the latter case. This distinction by which relief has been
limited in the case of retained counsel has been justified on either an
agency rationale or a "state action" theory."
Under the first theory, the accused was said to be bound through
the law of agency by the acts of his own privately retained attorney.
The application of this agency approach to the attorney-client relationship has been highly criticized because of the absence of the traditional
innocent third party injured by the acts of the principal's agent. Perhaps more significantly, the theory incorrectly presupposes a principal
sufficiently informed to direct and control his agent."' It can be assumed that a client never authorizes the incompetent handling of his
defense.
The second theory rests upon the fact that court-appointment of
an inadequate representative is clearly "state action" and, therefore,
27.

People v. Palmer, 27 111. 2d 311, 189 N.E.2d 265 (1963).

28. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). This is an appointed counsel case
but its weight is felt even in retained counsel cases. See Avery v. Alabama, 328 U.S.
444 (1940).

Justice Black states that the sixth amendment requires effective assistance

of counsel. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
of counsel in all criminal felony cases.

effective assistance

29. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation As a Ground For Post
Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289 (1964).

31. Id. Also, it can be assumed that a client never authorizes the totally incompetent handling of his case.
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subject to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
clause. On the other hand where there is a conviction of an accused
after wholly inadequate representation by retained counsel "state action" is more difficult to find. It could be contended that the licensing
of the attorney and his status as an officer of the court constitutes
"state action."
Furthermore, the entire conduct of the trial in which a person is
deprived of his life and liberty because of wholly inadequate representation can be asserted to be "state action." 2
Whatever the reason for so holding, the rule in Hurst barring claims
of inadequate representation by retained counsel expressly holds defense counsel's status as appointed or retained to be relevant to the
question of whether the defendant received a fair trial. Logic dictates an opposite result. The goal is a fair trial and one can easily
imagine a set of circumstances under which retained counsel's incompetency places the accused in a worse position than he would have
been in had he appeared pro se. Cases dealing with retained counsel
misrepresenting a fact to his client, thereby inducing him to plead
guilty are good illustrations.3 3 One such case discussing the importance of adequate representation is Wilson v. Rose34 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the reversal of the appellee's conviction, stating:
Appellee was entitled to the aid of counsel in determining his plea.
The decision to plead guilty is a decision to allow a judgment of
conviction to be entered without a hearing-a decision which is
irrevocable and which forecloses any possibility of establishing innocence . . . [the accused] needs the aid of counsel lest he be
the victim of overzealous prosecutors,
of the law's complexity, or of
35
his own ignorance or bewilderment.
The similarities between this case and those in which the retained
attorney does an extraordinarily ineffective job are obvious. In
neither case is the defendant permitted to favorably put forth his defense, and in both cases the client must bear the burden of defense
counsel's inadequacy. If the cases are similar in the respect that the
32. Id. at 300; see also Stanley v. United States, 329 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1956)
incompetency will not invalidate the conviction where inadequacy may not be imputed
to the State.
It should also be noted that when the court recognizes a difference between appointed
and retained counsel it is punishing a man because he can afford his own attorney.
33. People v. Washington, 41 111. 2d 6, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968); People v. Wegner,
40 Ill. 2d 28, 237 N.E.2d 486 (1968).
34. 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966).
35. Id. at 614.
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retained attorney has done an inadequate job, then reversal in one
warrants reversal in the other. A defendant subjected to wholly
ineffective representation should not be forced to suffer the consequences without relief in one situation and not in another based
upon an arbitrary distinction.
The Illinois Supreme Court's automatic dismissal of the incompetency of retained counsel in Hurst raises the possibility that defense
counsel's representation was so inept that it amounted to no representation. The major constitutional difficulties with this holding are obviated if it can be assumed that representation by a retained attorney
can never be so poor that the trial becomes a "sham" or a "mockery of
justice." The assumption is, however, difficult to make. There
has been a considerable neglect in the criminal area on the part of
most attorneys.
The bar has never given sufficient attention to the problem of criminal justice in America. Probably this is because most of our lawyers practice civil law exclusively and never come in contact with,
or acquire very great interest in, the problems of criminal justice.
Dean Pound has commented that in the general run of criminal
cases, taking the country over, counsel fall far short of the standard
which is maintained for civil cases., 6
While most appeals claiming incompetency of counsel do not have
merit, closing the door on an appeal without determining whether or
not the claim has any substance, creates the possibility of constitutional error. Because of the general lack of career criminal lawyers,
an allegation of incompetency should receive equal consideration along
with other claims of error.
37
A defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair one.
However, the concept of the adversary proceeding, which is basic to
our trial system, rests on a semblance of equality between counsels on
both sides. An accused confronted by a state prosecutor must be
allowed to present his defense as effectively as possible through counsel, or he is inevitably prejudiced to some degree. As the degree of
defense counsel's incompetency expands, so does the prejudice until, ultimately, there has been a denial of due process.
The courts have repeatedly stated that a client assumes the risk of
tactical and judgmental errors when he chooses his own attorney; how36. Schwartz, Cases & Materials On Professional Responsibility and the Administration of Criminal Justice, p. 103 National Counsel On Legal Clinics, American
Bar Center 1961, Chicago, Illinois.
37. People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 448, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
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ever, that risk should not include the possibility that his attorney will
do an extraordinarily inadequate job affording him no representation at all. Unfortunately, People v. Hurst obscures this distinction
and the Illinois courts following that rule will be unable to ascertain
whether there has been the representation necessary to comply with the
Constitution. To quote Justice Schaefer's admonishment in the Hurst
opinion:
To erect an insurmountable barrier which precludes all inquiry as
to the competence of the representation of a defendant in a criminal case solely upon the ground that he was represented by retained counsel is unwise, in my opinion, even apart from the serious
constitutional question it raises.38
MICHAEL

38.

42 I.

A. STIEGEL

2d at 226.
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